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Media images reflect and shape reality  
• Fears of Italian mafia’s power 
are not without grounds 
• Fears have driven organized 
crime policy at EU and UN levels 
and in many European countries  
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Two main questions 
What are the typifying characteristics  
of Italian mafia organizations?  
 
To what extent can these mafia organizations  
be considered the idealtype of organized crime  
in Western Europe? 
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Pentiti describe mafia world “not only 
from the outside but also from within”  
 
Mafia v. organized crime 
• Four characteristics distinguish mafia-type organizations 
from other organized crime (OC) actors 
1. Longevity 
2. Organizational and cultural complexity  
3. Claim to exercise a political dominion over areas of 
settlement 
4. Resulting ability to control legitimate markets 
• Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta meet all four 
characteristics, some camorra groups latter two 
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Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta  
• Cosa Nostra (“Our Thing”): confederation of about 150 
mafia groups, primarily located in western Sicily  
– No groups outside Sicily, only single individuals 
– 2,000-3,000 ritually affiliated members 
• ‘Ndrangheta (“Society of Men of Honour”): 
confederation of about 150 mafia groups, primarily 
located in southern Calabria 
– Groups are present also in Northern Italy, some European 
countries, Canada and Australia 
– Up to 10,000 ritually affiliated members 
 
 
 
10 
Strongholds of Italian mafia organizations 
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Cosa Nostra ’Ndrangheta 
camorra 
Camorra 
• Multiplicity of independent groups located in Campania, 
particularly Naples and Caserta provinces:  
– Mafia-type groups, often family based, such as Casalesi 
– Groups formed around a charismatic leader, such as Nuova 
Camorra Organizzata 
– Youth gangs and common criminals 
• Groups and alliances are so unstable that offence of 
“mafia-type criminal organization” (art. 416bis Italian 
penal Code) cannot frequently be charged  
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Other mafia organizations? 
• Stidda (“Star”) in southern-west Sicily and gangs in 
northern Calabria 
– Much lower cohesion and political resources 
• Sacra Corona Unita (“United Holy Crown”) and other 
Apulian groups  
– Sacra Corona Unita no longer exists, but criminal activities go on 
• Foreign criminals active in Italy 
– Mostly illicit entrepreneurs but Chinese groups sometimes also 
aim at political power in their communities 
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1. Longevity 
• Antecedents of Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta  were 
active from 1880s on 
• Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta still possess pre-modern 
traits, such as “status and fraternization contracts” 
(Weber) 
• Contemporary camorra groups do not descend from 19th 
century camorra  
15 
2a. Organizational complexity 
• Groups are called “families” but are distinct from blood 
families and have their own ruling bodies  
– Due to larger size, ’Ndrangheta groups have more complicated 
structure than Cosa Nostra’s 
• Superordinate bodies of coordination were created since 
1960s in Cosa Nostra, since 1990 in ’Ndrangheta, but have 
limited powers 
– Unity is guaranteed by sharing of cultural codes and 
organizational formula 
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Ruling offices of an ’Ndrangheta  group 
SOCIETA’ MAGGIORE
SOCIETA’ MINORE
Capo locale
Capo società
Mastro di buon
ordine
Contabile
Mastro di
giornata
Capo giovane
Picciotto di giornata Puntaiolo
Libero e
vincolato
‘Ndrangheta structure 
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2b. Cultural complexity 
• Both organizations have sophisticated cultural 
apparatus, consisting of symbols, rituals and a set of 
rules comparable to rules of simple society 
• Honor and omertà are two main subcultural codes  
• Ceremony of initiation is most powerful ritual, creates 
“status and fraternization contracts” (Weber) 
– New members are required to become “men of honor” and 
behave brotherly with each other 
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Mafiosi used to take mafia initiation 
ceremony seriously  
• Serafino Castagna, former ’Ndrangheta member: 
– ‘At the end of the meeting, I felt as if I had grown in 
stature; I was no longer a nobody, but a camorrista, 
somebody who had to respect the law of honor and to 
ensure that it was respected by others’ (1967)  
 
• Cosa Nostra defector, Gaspare Mutolo: 
– ‘When I became a member, it was for me a new life,  
with new rules. For me only Cosa Nostra existed’ (1993) 
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Mafia groups’ strength and weakness lie 
in status and fraternization contracts 
• Contracts guarantee extraordinary flexibility 
– Mafia bosses dispose of members’ workforce – and  
even life – to reach their goals 
• Contracts can be imposed only on persons  
socialized to specific values  
– Acquisition of resources to compete on international  
illegal markets is difficult 
• Growing contradiction between contract value system and 
mafiosi’s concrete activities 
– Mafia legitimacy is questioned and many members defect 
• ’Ndrangheta’s cohesion strengthened by blood ties 
3. Political dominion 
• Mafia-type groups do not just aim at profit, are 
multifunctional 
• Claim political dominion over specific territory 
– Town, village or neighbourhood in larger cities 
• Mafia power has long had higher degree of effectiveness 
and legitimacy than government’s 
• It was long recognized by the state 
22 
Contemporary manifestations  
of mafia political ambitions 
• ‘Tax’ local productive activities 
• Mediate conflicts and guarantee property rights when 
asked 
• Have allies among local politicians, control local life 
– Since 1991 over 200 city councils have been dismissed because 
of mafia infiltrations, including Reggio Calabria 
• Share favours with national politicians 
• Kill or intimidate dangerous government representatives 
– Cosa Nostra even organized several terrorist attacks 
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4. Control of markets 
• Extortion:  
– Pizzo (protection money) imposition/payment + 
– Forced purchase of unnecessary products and participation in public 
tenders 
• Mafiosi have played since 1950s crucial role in construction 
market and manipulation of public tenders 
• Locally, they have also gained control of other markets  
– From food to new energies 
• Camorra groups are specialized in counterfeited products 
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Mafia control should not be exaggerated 
• Estimates of mafia turnover published in Italy are 
“mythical numbers” 
– E.g., ’Ndrangheta’s turnover equals 3% of Italy’s GDP or mafia 
groups turnover is €137 bl (Eurispes and Confesercenti) 
• Mafia groups have not established monopoly on  any 
legitimate or even illegal market outside Southern Italy 
• Rarely seek political dominion outside southern Italy 
• Cosa Nostra’s power is challenged even in its strongholds 
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Mafia groups sharply hit  
by repression since 1992 
• All Cosa Nostra chiefs and many ’Ndrangheta 
bosses were captured 
– Totò Riina in January 1993 
– Bernardo Provenzano in April 2006 
– Pasquale Condello in February 2008 
• Rank-and-file mafiosi were also decimated 
– 2,032, 2661 and 2,941 people arrested for 416bis 
in Sicily, Calabria and Campania by DIA alone 
between 1992 and June 2014 
• Given previous membership estimates, 
probability of being arrested has become 
very high  
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Mafiosi are imprisoned  
and impoverished 
• Many mafiosi were convicted to heavy sentences 
– 6,758 Italians served sentences for crime of mafia association 
(Art. 416bis) as of June 2013 
– 645 mafiosi were held under special incarceration regime  
(Art. 41bis of the penitentiary law) as of Dec. 2009   
• Financial drain was also heavy 
– DIA seized assets worth of over €13 billion in 1992-June 2014 
– Sketchy sentences confirmed by qualitative evidence 
• Many mafia groups stopped paying salaries to imprisoned members  
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Law enforcement successes   
often made possible by Pentiti    
• Over 1,200 former OC members were under state 
protection programme at peak in late 1996 
• Two factors fostered pentiti’s boom 
– Legislation granting them sanctioning and penitentiary benefits and 
creating a state protection programme in 1991  
– Crisis of mafia legitimation system and Cosa Nostra’s use of violence  
• After 35% decline, new growth since 2006: 1,093 pentiti in 
2011 
• Pentiti also enabled investigations on “mafia protectors” 
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Giulio Andreotti: former Italian Prime 
Minister, tried but acquitted for collaboration 
with Cosa Nostra (statute of limitation 
applied until 1982) 
Salvatore Cuffaro: 
former President 
of the Region 
Sicily, sentenced 
to 7-year 
imprisonment for 
favouring Cosa 
Nostra 
Marcello Dell’Utri: former 
right-hand of Berlusconi 
and European MP of PdL, 
sentenced to 7-year 
imprisonment for 
favouring Cosa Nostra 
Silvio Berlusconi: former Prime 
Minister, accused  by several mafia 
defectors of ordering Falcone and 
Borsellino’s murders and Cosa 
Nostra’s terroristic attacks in 1993, 
but never charged 
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Mafia groups’ reaction to repression  
has been manifold 
• Minimisation of mafia groups’ visibility 
– Reversal of open challenge to state sovereignty  
– Drastic reduction in mafia murders (see next slide) 
– Focus on entrepreneurial activities not raising public alarm  
• In Cosa Nostra, return to segmentation and “old rules” 
– No meetings of commissions since mid-1990s 
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Crime statistics 
indicate  
strong decline 
in violence  
in all of 
Southern Italy 
  Calabria Sicily Campania 
  Murders 
Mafia 
murders 
Murders 
Mafia 
murders 
Murders 
Mafia 
murders 
1990 326 141 428 150 347 201 
1991 277 165 481 253 378 232 
1992 151 46 399 200 290 181 
1993 126 43 252 85 197 86 
1994 121 42 249 90 165 65 
1995 95 24 223 88 228 113 
1996 103 30 180 66 204 94 
1997 100 32 131 34 185 103 
1998 85 28 140 35 199 107 
1999 82 26 116 28 151 65 
2000 84 34 86 13 163 73 
2001 88 28 82 20 127 57 
2002 61 17 70 11 109 47 
2003 69 26 61 10 125 70 
2004 76 18 65 8 178 99 
2005 69 23 70 11 128 67 
2006 61 19 62 15 140 67 
2007 59 16 72 12 152 85 
2008 76 22 49 12 111 59 
2009 64 11 63 19 104 49 
2010 60 24 60 10 62 18 
2011 59 11 59 8 61 27 
2012 52 14 56 8 89 38 
1991-
2011 
-79% -93% -88% 97% -84% -88% 
Source: Istat, 
several years. 
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Crisis, but no defeat 
• Cosa Nostra is weakened as never before, other mafia 
groups also hit hard by antimafia government action 
• Government action is part of a long-term process of 
delegitimation of mafia subculture 
– Supported by ever larger strata of Southern Italian population 
• Other typical values and institutions remain widely 
accepted 
– E.g., primacy of family, particularistic interests and patronage 
• Basis for corrupt exchanges with politicians 
• Chronic underemployment provides manpower 
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Is the Italian mafia an idealtype of 
organized crime in Europe? 
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It depends … 
… on definition of organized crime 
Who has been more dangerous and why? 
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It depends … 
… on the criteria chosen 
• Background 
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Offense: “Associazione  
a delinquere di tipo mafioso” 
• A mafia-type delinquent organization consists of three or 
more persons  
– “who belong to it make use of the power of intimidation 
afforded by the associative bond and the state of subjugation 
and criminal silence (omertà) which derives from such a bond to 
commit crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the 
management or control of economic activities, concessions, 
authorizations or public contracts and services, either to gain 
unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for others.” 
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